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Responsibility is one of the legal institutions tha t is to be found in any 
•domain of the legal system and in every branch of law. The institution of legal 
responsibility is closely connected with observing the legal rules because in 
every field of law the declaration of responsibility enables sanctions to be 
.applied against persons committing a violation of a law. 
The same establishment refers to the institution of the responsibility of 
States according to international law, as well, its norms being to be considered 
as a guarantee of observing generally the other norms of international law. 
A t the same time, the responsibility according to the rules of international law, 
as a legal institution comprehending the whole field of international law, raises 
several theorectical and practical questions in which there could not be formed 
any uniform view either by theory or by state practice, as yet. The problem 
of responsibility in international law can be raised not only in connection with 
t he injurious behaviour of States but also with that of . other subjects of inter-
national law. The present, paper is not treating of the questions connected with 
the latter ones. It raises even in connection with the international responsibility 
of States only a few questions, f irst of all how far the general notion of the 
legal responsibility developed in the municipal law can be applied to the inter-
national relations and if this international 'liability belongs to the category of 
delictual or to that of objective liability. 
Manuscript closed on April 25th 1972. 
* * * 
The responsibility of States according to international law has developed 
in its present form comparatively late. That does not mean that the States in 
the past have not avenged any presumed or true insults or injuries they had 
sufferred. But they could reconcile with the concept of sovereignty only with 
difficulty that a State can incur liability for any action towards the other 
States on the basis of international law. This idea has arisen also in the science 
of international law where, at the end of the last century we still met the 
opinion that ". . . les Etats ne sont responsables que devant aux-méme. L'idée 
d 'une responsabilité reciproque des Etats est contradictoire avec l'idée de 
souveraineté".1 This refusal of the international responsibility of States could 
•not be considered, at any rate, as general and did not mean even then the 
assertion that, in some cases, the violation of international law did not involve 
an obligation of the injurious State according to international law. It refers 
1 Th. Funck-Brentano et A. Sorel: Précis de droit des gens. 3® éd., Paris, 1900. 
pp. 224—225. . 
3 
ra ther to a terminological crudeness. From among the older Hungar ian au thors , 
e. g., Pál Tassy is establishing: "Although international law does not know i n 
international relations any injurious acts for which the committer could b e 
called to account and punished by a certain authority, there are, according t a 
international, law, as well, wrongful acts tha t committed without violating: 
antecedents bring about the obligation of satisfaction."2 The concept of i n t e r -
national i n ju ry and connected sànctions was therefore known by the old l i t e -
ra ture of international law, too, only the expression international responsibil i ty 
whose notion and content have gradually developed was applied not v e r y 
often.3 In the institution of international responsibility dominated for à long 
time, mainly at t he end of the Nineteenth Century and at t he beginning of t h e 
Twentieth one, as referred to by several scholars, the civil-law conception,4 
tha t is to say, it was first of all emphasized tha t the State was obliged to 
compensation for any material and moral damages caused to other States. 
This idea dominated for a long t ime strongly in the bourgeois ju r i sprudence 
and the part isans of this opinion can be found even a t present. Thus f o r 
example, in connection with the source of responsibility in international law, 
a French expert of international law, L. Cavaré establishes: "La responsabil i té 
internationale a en générale pour source un dommage causé soit à u n Etat,, 
soit à un individu."5 The opinion quoted narrows down in itself t he sphere of 
international responsibility considerably, by limiting it only to damages. A 
fu r the r limitation is brought about by Cavaré's following establishment : "Mais 
le plus habituellement l 'origine des questions de responsabilité réside dans des 
dommages causés à des individus nationaux d 'un Etat se t rouvant établis s u r 
le terri toire d 'un au t re Etat, par les autorités de ce dernier (autorités législa-
tive, gouvernementale, administrative, judiciaire)."6 The restriction of the res -
ponsibility of State to a compensation for damages caused to foreigners i s 
particularly wide-spread in the American l i terature of international law. F o r 
instance Ch. G. Fenwick, in his Manual published in 1965,. is interpret ing t h e 
responsibility expressly as a relation between the State and the foreign ci-
tizens.7 As even at the beginning of the codification carried out by the League 
2 Tassy, Pál: Az európai ' nemzetközi jog vezérfonala (A guide to the European 
international law). Kecskemét, 1887. p. 103, 
3 Thus e. g., from among the older Hungarian experts of international law 
István Apáthy is speaking about "Obligations originating from prohibited acts and 
situations" (Cf.: Apáthy, I.: Tételes európai nemzetközi jog [Positive European inter-
national law]. Budapest, 1888. 2d edr pp. .229—232). Others, e. g. F. Despagnet, are 
speaking about non-contractual obligations between States (des obligations non-
contractuelles entre les Etats) but already using the expression "responsibility", as 
well. (Cp. F. Despagnet: Cours de droit international public. 3° éd. Paris, 1905. pp. 
563—566,) 
4 Cf., e. g., G. Tunkin A nemzetközi jog elméletének kérdései (Problems of the 
theory of international law). Budapest, 1963, especially: pp. 249—250. 
5 L. Cavaré: Le droit international public positif. 2° éd., Paris, 1962, tome II. 
p. 342. 
c Ibidem. 
7 Cf.: Ch. G. Fenwick: International Law. New York, p. 328. Speaking about the 
responsibility of State, the American expert of international law, W. W. Bishop, too, 
takes the opinion that it is a field of law that is in connection with the violation of 
the law of foreigners ("This field of law, .roughly corresponding to the private law of 
tort or delict, may be thought of as the protection of nationals abroad or as the law 
of international claims"). W. W. Bishop: International Law: Cases and Materials. 
Boston, 1954, p. 464. 
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•of Nations and la ter under the auspices of t h e United Nations Organization 
the responsibility of the State was regarded f i rs t of all ás a liability for the 
damages caused to the foreigners on its territory, the responsibility of State 
according to international law, as a general legal institution relating to the 
whole of the international law, is containing at present, too, a number of unset t-
led, controversial problems concerning which innumerable, antagonistic opi-
nions have arisen. 
In connection with the responsibility of t he State according to international 
law it is f i rs t .of all to be clarified: what is its relation to the general legal 
•concept of responsibility, resp. is there at all a notion of responsibility like this, 
•comprehending both t he domains of internal and of international laws? 
The legal system, as a concrete system of valid legal nprms connected wi th 
•a'State, contains two separable normative systems: internal law and in terna-
tional law. These two normative systems differ f rom each other in several 
relations, thus f irst of all in the way of their origin but both of them are 
representing t h e law of State, subjected to the general notion of law, according 
to which there are to be understood by law the rules of behaviour expressing 
•class interest, induced by the will of State and arranging the mutual relations 
of the subjects of law the observance of which is ensured, if needed, by the 
•constraint of State.8 Both normative systems know the institution of the viola-
tion of law and the responsibility, for it. The violation of law involves in both 
laws the possibility of applying sanctions. There can exist, therefore, on 
principle a general notion of legal responsibility that applies to the legal 
branches of both normative systems of the legal order. For solving the question, 
it is advisable to investigate first the systems of responsibility developed in 
the several branches of the . internal law, piartly because internal law is much 
more developed than international law and also the problem of responsibility 
was, therefore, elaborated in its f ramework earlier, part ly because the theory 
of responsibility of the State in international law has borrowed .very much 
from the internal law. 
Examining the expression "responsibility" in the etymological sense of the 
word, it originates f rom the verb "to respond". To be responsible means that 
we have to face the consequences for certain actions. Responsibility, in this 
widest sense of the word, is brought up concerning any rules of human conduct 
in society. We are responsible for violating the conventional norms and can 
speak of moral, political, etc. responsibilities,. as well. Responsibility, in this 
widest sense, too, is usually composed of two components: 
(1) First of all, it is necessary to f ind a conduct that is in contradiction 
with the conventional, moral, party-disciplinary, sport-association, etc. norms, 
violating them; 
(2) It is also necessary to responsibility tha t the behaviour contested should 
be attributable, imputable to the committer tha t means that the liability may 
be influenced, mitigated, and even excluded by certain conditions. 
The behaviour that contravenes the mentioned norms can be expressed 
not only by an action or an omission. There may be reproved morally some 
8 Cf. in details at Károly Nagy: A nemzetközi jog jogrendszerbeli helyének és 
tagozódásának néhány kérdése a jog általános fogalmának tükrében (Several prob-
lems of the place in the legal system and the structure of international law in the 
light of the general concept of law). In: „Jogtudományi Közlöny" (Journal of Juris-
prudence, Budapest), 1972. Nos. 1—2, particularly pp. 39—45. 
emotion or thought, as well as that is expressed in a. way noticeable by others-
Legal responsibility, on the other hand, comprises a more restricted domain, 
than moral responsibility.9 Here is the basis of responsibility an action or-
omission manifested in the external world, as well,10 that is dangerous for the 
society and tha t is illicit and imputable to the perpetrator . The legal responsi-
bility contains, therefore, essentially the same elements as the responsibility 
originating f rom the violation of other norms, its consequences are, however , 
prescribed by legal rules. But the internal legal normative system; controlling 
the behaviour of individuals is not uniform, legal branches are formed inside-
it with own content, method and formations of responsibility corresponding t o 
them.11 The legal responsibility always appears, therefore, in a concrete case in 
the relation of some branch of law. An individual is liable not according to 
the law generally but to the labour law, criminal law, etc. It is, of course, not 
impossible that the same action can -involve legal consequences on the basis of 
more branches of law at the same time:12 somebody may be responsible f o r 
the same action according to civil law and criminal law, as well. The r e spon-
sibility formations of the single branches of law have a number of special 
peculiarities inducing considerable differences, legal isolation in these respon-
sibility formations. E. g., in civil law illegality may be imagined in some cases 
without any liability,13 what is unknown in the domain of criminal law. T h e 
delimitation of malice and negligence that is so relevant in criminal law a s 
well as in the labour law and of the agricultural cooperative law, has a much 
lower importance in civil law owing to the reparat ive character of sanctions-
there. The consequences of in ju ry are of di f ferent character in the admin i s t -
rat ive law, civil law or criminal law. In the administrative law, responsibility 
exists first of ali to an administrative organ; in civil law, to the person w h o s e 
rights were prejudiced; while in criminal law, responsibility is immediate ly 
valid towards the whole of society, etc.15 
In all these there are manifested the non-insignificant differences existing: 
between the single formations of responsibility. But in the last resort t h e r e 
exists an — anyway very general — concept of responsibility comprehending; 
all the liability formations in internal law,16 the most general elements of which. 
9 Cf.: Gyula Eörsi: A jogi felelősség alapproblémái, a polgári jogi felelősség. 
(Fundamental problems of legal liability; liability in civil law.) Budapest, 1961, p. 45. 
10 Cf.: Gy. Eörsi: Op. cit., p. 43. 
11 Cf.: Mihály Samu: A szocialista jogrendszer tagozódásának alapja. (Structural 
basis of the socialistic legal system.) Budapest, 1964, p. 192. 
12 Cf., e. g., László Nagy: Anyagi felelősség a munkaviszony keretében okozott, 
károkért (Material liability for damages caused in a labour relation). Budapest, 1964, 
PP- 11—12; also Gy. Eörsi is writing similarly: "The single social relations, however,, 
do not become isolated from one another, and they do particularly not become isola-
ted correspondingly to the structure of the legal system. Each" kind of behaviour 
may, therefore, fall under the prohibition of more branches of law and elicit several 
kinds of santions" (Op. cit., p. 72). 
13 Gy. Eörsi is bringing forward in this connection as an example a contract 
concluded by a person incapable of action that is invalid without the existence of 
imputability and, therefore, of liability. (Cf.: Op. cit., p. 66.) 
14 Gy. Eörsi: Op. cit., pp. 11—113. 
15 Gy. Eörsi: Op. cit., p. 206. 
16 This is László Nagy's opinion, too, who establishes: "We ought to speak, 
therefore, of. legal liability as a comprehensive category comprising the criminal, 
disciplinary and material liability or, categorizing in another way: the liability in 
civil law, criminal law, law of work, etc." (Op. cit., p. 27.) 
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are, according to Gyula Eörsi: "(a) illegality, (b) imputability, (c) state rep-
ression".17 
The normative system of international law — in contradistinction to the 
law.inside the State — cannot be divided, as yet, into special branches of law 
arranging different relations of life, with a peculiar content, method and with 
special formations of responsibility.18 That involves a number of difficulties. 
The condition, namely, that in international law ' there are not, as yet, any 
separate branches of law does not mean at all tha t its rules are arranging 
conditions of the same type and importance the violations of which a re to be 
qualified in the same way. For instance, the responsibility of a State violating 
with its action an international obligation originated f rom a reciprocal agree-
ment entered into with an other State (e. g., not fulfi l l ing a commercial t reaty 
may differ f rom a case where it violated a cogent norm of international law, 
for example making war. It is not indifferent, either, if the immediatley 
offended par ty is a foreign State or a foreign citizen. It is important, as well, 
f rom the point of view of the culpability of a State, whether the in ju ry was 
committed by its Government or only a mistake of a judicial organ is in 
question opposite to a foreign citizen, etc. All these enable u s to make some 
distinctions inside the responsibility according to international law, and these 
distinctions are actually necessary. To be sure, the responsibility according to 
international law is to be investigated, for the time being, as a whole as the 
exact differences inside international law between the single formations of 
liability have not been elaborated, as yet, either by the theory or by the state 
practice. We cannot even say, as yet, that some major i ty or generally accepted 
accord has been arrived at in all the major, general theoretical questions of 
the responsibility in international law. That means, at any rate, that speaking 
about the notion of responsibility in international law we think, in fact, of a 
concept as general as that of the legal responsibility in internal law as an 
institution relating to the entirety of the law within a State. In the liability 
according to international law, the various responsility formations developing 
in the f r ame of international relations are, therefore, manifested together, and 
even some components taken over f rom the responsibility types developed in 
internal laws are mixed with them. The elaboration of the exact content and 
possible variants of the responsibility in international law is rendered more 
difficult by another circumstance, too, namely that a considerable par t of in-
ternational law are arranging relations between States of bourgeois and so-
cialistic types. The theory of responsibility can, therefore, t ake shape — both 
in jurisprudence and in the codification of States — only af te r these different 
legal conceptions being harmonized. Returning to the investigation of the 
problem, to what extent the concept of the general legal responsibility is to 
be applied to the responsibility in international law, we have to examine the 
single components of that. As seen, one of the components of the legal respon-
sibility is illegality. In this connection the international jurisprudence is by 
and large uniform, i. e., it requires for the responsibility of a State according 
to international law first of all some international illegality, that is to say, the 
breach of a duty prescribed by international law. This standpoint is represent 
17 Gy. Eörsi: Op. cit., p. 60. 
18 Cf. about that: Károly Nagy: Op. cit. 
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m 
ted by A. Ulloa,19 R. Ago,20 C. Parry,21 R. Monaco,22 A. P. Sereni,23 H. Kelsen,24 
G. Geamanu,25 V. I. Lisovsky,26 and by others, too. The breach of an in ter -
national duty is regarded as the basis of responsibility by the various codifi-
cation projects, as well, thus e. g., Article One of a Draf t adopted in f irst 
reading at the Codification Conference of The Hague in 1930,27 Article One 
of a Dra f t prepared by the Deutsche Gesellschaft f ü r Völkerrecht28 and this 
standpoint is accepted also . by Roberto Ago in his Report Two presented to 
the International Law Commission.29 
The violation of international law is therefore, according to the generally 
accepted opinion, an element of responsibility, and even its basis. The com-
mission of a violation of international law, as a behaviour opposite to in te r -
national law, induces an international legal relation. In the question, however, 
between whom this relation takes place, and in other questions, too, in con-
nection with that relation, the opinions vary. 
According to the traditional doctrine, the international responsibility means 
a bilateral legal relation between the offening and offended States. E. J imenez 
de Arechaga is writ ing about that in this way : "Whenever a duty established 
by any rule of in te rna t iona l l aw has been breached by act or omission, a new 
legal relationship automatically comes into existence. This relationship is esta-
blished between the subject to which the act is imputable, who must " respond" 
by making adequate reparation, and the subject who has a claim to reparat ion 
because of the breach of duty."30 A similar point of view is represented in 
connection with responsibility as legal ' re la t ion by A. Verdross too, who es-
tablishes: "Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortl ichkeit besteht grundsätzlich nur 
denjenigen Staaten gegenüber, die unmittelbar durch das völkerrechtswidrige 
Verhalten verletzt wurden. Es können daher auch bei der Verletzung einer 
gewohnheitsrechtlichen Norm oder eines Kollektivvertrages grundsätzlich n u r 
jene Staaten einschreiten) die durch das völkerrechtliche .Unrecht geschädigt 
wurden. Das blosse ideelle Interesse' der übrigen Staaten an der Einhal tung 
der Völkerrechtsordnung reicht somit nicht hin um einen solchen Anspruch zu 
19 A. Ulloa: Derecho internacional publico. Madrid, 1957. Tomo II, p. 251. 
20 R. Ago: Le délit international, Recueil des Cours, 1939. Tome 68, pp. 450 sqq. 
21 C. Parry: Some considérations upon the protection of individuals in inter-
national law. Recueil des Cours, 1956. Tome 90, particularly pp. 672—673. 
22 R. Monaco: Manuale di Diritto Internazionale pubblico e privato. Toririo, 
1949, p. 328. 
23 A. P. Sereni: Diritto internazionale. Milano, 1962. III. pp. 1503 sqq. 
34 Cf.: Théorie du droit international public, Recueil des Cours, 1953. Tome 84, 
p. 88; or: Principles of International Law. New York, 1956, p. 9. 
25 G. Geamänu: Dreptul international contemporan. Bucuresti, 1965, p. 216. 
26 V. I. Lisovsky: Mezhdunarodnoe pravo. Kiev, 1955, p. 94. 
27 "Tout manquement aux obligations internationales d'un Etat du fait de ses 
organes qui cause un dommage à la personne ou aux biens d'un étranger sur le 
territoire de cet Etat entraîne la responsabilité internationale de celui-ci." 
28 "Jeder Staat ist den änderen Staaten gegenüber für den Schaden verantwort-
lich die auf seinem Gebiete fremden Staatsangahörigen an ihrer Person oder an ihrem 
Vermögen dadurch erwächst, dass er eine ihm) anderen Staaten gegenüber obliegende 
völkerrechtliche Pflicht verletzt." 
29 Cf.: A/CN. 4 § 233. 20 avril 1970, p. 48. 
30 E. Jimenez de Aréchaga: International Responsibility. (In: Manual Of Public 
International Law, Edited by M. Serensen.) London—Melbourne—Toronto, 1968. p. 533. 
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begründen."31 The responsibility is regarded also by M. Sibert,32 Ch. Rousseau33 
as a relation between the States committing and suffer ing injury. And even, 
this opinion appeared in the old practice of international legal courts, as well; 
thus the judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice of June 
14th 1938 declared: "S'agissant d 'un acte imputable à l 'Etat et décrit comme 
contraire aux droits conventionnels d 'un autre Etat, la responsabilité inter-
nationale s 'établirait directement dans le plan des relations entre ces Etats."34 
This theory is related in details in a very through-going' monograph of D. 
Anzilotti. In his opinion, the violation of international law, if considered as a 
violation of the objective law (diritto oggettivo), cannot induce any legal con-
nection between the States because there doesn't exist any legally organized 
superior power above the single States, having authori ty to invest the norms 
of international law with a legally binding force and to retaliate the violation 
of these norms only because they belong to international law.35 If, however, 
the violation of the norms of international law violates, at the same time, the 
subjective right of the States, as well, then the injured State itself can raise 
a claim against the offending State with the means ensured by international 
law, failing a supernational organization, above the States.36 There comes, 
therefore, f rom the violation of a legal norm a relative right for the State 
that suffered the injury. This right is valid exclusively against the offending 
State.37 Moreover, to regard the international responsibility as a legal relation 
between two States may often mean that it is only a responsibility of the 
offending State for repairs. An' interpretat ion of responsibility like tha t is 
widely accepted in the international l i terature. In this opinion is, e. g., F. Ber-
ber according to whom f rom the violation of the pr imary legal relation there 
is induced a new legal relation, being aimed first of all at repairing the damage 
caused.38 The responsibility in international law is regarded as an obligation 
for repairing the damage by C. Eagleton39 and others, too. In addition, as the 
31 A. Verdross: Völkerrecht. 4. Aufl. Wien, 1959. p. 297. 
32 Cf.: Traité de Droit International Public. Tome I. Paris, 1951, p. 3101. 
33 Suivant la doctrine ordinairement admise, la responsabilité internationale est 
toujours une relation d'Etat à Etat" (Ch. Rousseau: Droit international public. 3̂ . éd 
1965, p. 104). 
34 C. P. J. I. Phosphates du Maroc, série A/B, № 74, p. 28. 
35 Cf.: D. Anzilotti: Teoria Generale délia Responsabilité dello Stato nel Diritto 
Internazionale. Firenze, 1902, p. 82. 
30 D. Anzilotti: Op. cit., p. 83. 
37 D. Anzilotti: Op. cit., p. 100. A similar standpoint is expounded in the Manual 
of the author, as well: "Au fait illicite, c'est-à-dire, en formule générale, à la viola-
tion d'un devoir international, se rattache ainsi la naissance d'un nouveau rapport 
juridique entre l'Etat auquel est imputable le fait dont il s'agit, qui est tenu à 
réparation, et l'Etat envers lequel existait le devoir non exécuté qui peut exiger la 
réparation." (Cours de Droit International, Paris. 1929, p. 467.) 
38 "Kraft der Haftung entsteht bei Verletzung der primären Rechtspflicht ein 
neues Rechtsverhältnis, das den Haftenden, den Verantwortlichen verpflichtet, den 
früheren Zustand wiederherzustellen oder wo dies nicht möglich oder nicht zumutbar 
ist, den durch die Rechtsverletzung entstandenen Schaden zu ersetzen" (F. Berber: 
Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Bd.. III. München und Berlin. 1964, p. 2). Almost the 
same idea is expressed in G. Dahm's Manual, as well : "Die Verletzung der primären 
Rechtspflicht also ruft sekundäre Rechtspflichten hervor, Pflichten nämlich zur 
Wiederherstellung (Restitution) und zur Entschädigung des Verletzten..." (Author's 
italics). Cf.: G. Dahm: Völkerrecht. Bd. 3. Stuttgart, p. 178. 
39 C. Eagleton: The Responsibility of States in International Law. New York, 
1928, p. 3. 
State and private codifications have endeavoured to regulate the liability as 
regards the damages caused to foreigners in the state territory, in the course 
of these there was emphasized similarly mainly the liability for damages. In 
this way, for example, it was declared in Article One of a Dra f t of Harvard 
Law School in 1929: "A State is responsible, as the term is used in this con-
vention, when it has a duty to make reparat ion to another State for the i n ju ry 
sustained by the latter State as a consequence of an in jury to its nat ional ." 
Other opinions that otherwise do not restrict the responsibility of State to 
an obligation of indemnification see in responsibility a general commitment 
of reparation. This opinion is represented by a Brazilian expert of internat ional 
law, H. Accioly,40 also the Permanent Court of International Justice held in 
the dispute of the Chorzow Factory Case in i ts judgement of September 13th 
1928 that ". . . la Cour constate que c'est un principe du droit internat ional 
voire une conception générale du droit, que toute violation d 'un engagement 
comporte l 'obligation de réparer".4 1 The opinions quoted that concern the 
essence of responsibility emphasize rightly one of its elements, namely tha t 
the violation of law induces a secondary legal relation. They have, however, 
two fundamenta l deficiencies: (a) As referred to rightly by the Soviet professor 
G. Tunkin, if the violation of an international obligation brings about a new 
obligation and it is not met by the State, either, then a fu r ther newer obli-
gation comes about according to this opinion, in case of breaching this liability, 
too, a newer one more, and this process could be continued in this way ad 
infinitum,42 (b) On the other hand, the responsibility of State cannot be restric-
ted to a unilateral obligation of reparations of the State committing the viola-
tion of law if only because, howerer an obligation like that is actually brought 
about by the responsibility in international law, — as the Societ experts of 
international law, as well, refer to — the responsibility also enables sanctions 
to be applied against the State violating law.43 The sanction is a general na tura l 
consequence of the violation of law. And this r ight supposes, too, on the other 
hand, that the State violating the law, apart f rom its obligation of reparations, 
has another duty, as well: it must endure the sanctions applied against it. Had 
it not been obliged to tolerate that then it could regard the coercive actions 
executing the sanctions against it as illegal measures and take legal steps 
against them.44 The responsibility of a State in international law brings there-
fore about a double obligation of the violating State, partly .an obligation to 
repair, partly an obligation to tolerate the sanctions. But if responsibility in-
duces also an obligation to tolerate the sanction then it is logical that , on the 
other hand, it creates a subjective right, as well, for the State or other subject 
of international law violated, to apply the sanction. This, however, does not 
mean necessarily that this bilateral legal relation has only two subjects, coming 
about always between the violating and violated' States. The conception of 
40 H. Accioly: Principes généraux de la responsabilité internationale d'après la 
doctrine et la jurisprudence. Recueil des Cours, 1959. Tome 96, p. 353. 
41 Publications de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, Série A—N° 
17, p. 29. 
42 G. Tunkin: A nemzetközi jog elméletének kérdései (Problems of the theory 
of international law). Budapest, 1963, p. 254. 
43 Cf.: D. B. Levin: Otvestvennosty gosudarstv v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom 
prave. Moskva, 1966, pp. 10—11. 
44 Cf.: G. Tunkin: Op. cit., p. 296. 
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responsibility as a legal relation between two States was suitable for the old 
theory of international law where in individual interest was predominant and 
any international conflicts included also the armed ones, were considered, 
therefore, as the private affairs of the States interested. Since then, however, 
radical changes have taken place in international law and the idea of public 
interest has come more and more into prominence besides the individual 
interests.45 Since the Charter of the U. N. O. being created, the war definitely 
ceased to be a private affa i r of the touched States, it is qualified as an inter-
national delict, and the States may raise a claim against the committer, acting 
unitedly and is concert, through the Security Council, taking no regard to 
against which ever and how many of them it was directed. Under the present 
conditions, every war touches more or less immediately the interests of all the 
other States. In connection with that it was established by the Soviet Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromiko in 1960: "If already a quarter of a Century 
ago we had any legal basis to recognize that peace is indivisible then it is much 
more valid for our days, for the age of the modern armaments of an up-to-date 
warfare when only some minutes are needed for getting over the distances 
between the countries of the world lying even the far thest f rom each other."46 
The problem of s tate liability is raised in a general sense by the Dra f t of the 
Czechoslovak Government submitted at the Seventeenth Session of the General 
Assembly of the U. N. O., in the course of the debate as regards the funda -
mental principles in international law concerning the amicable connections and 
co-operation of States: "L'Etat est responsable de la violation des normes du 
droit international, surtout s'il s'agit d'actions mettant en danger la paix et 
la sécurité et les relations amicales entre les peuples, de même qu'en cas 
d'actions violant les droits légitimes d 'autres Etats et de leurs citoyens."47 The 
responsibility for violating peace cannot be considered, therefore, in our days 
any more as a relation between the aggressor and the attacked State. That is, 
to be sure, not the single case as an international delict is directed against the 
community of States, t he whole international community. In opposition to the 
older conception in international law — according to which the State is only 
bound by norms accepted by it by express terms or by implication — there 
has appeared the concept of ius cogens (peremtory norm) in international law, 
touching the problem of international responsibility, as well. The contraposition 
of cogent and dispositive norms applies some notions borrowed f rom internal 
law, first of all f rom civil law. The cogent law in civil law means that the 
validity of rules like these cannot be excluded by the contracting parties, they 
are compulsory without any condition, being valid independently of the agree-
ment of parties. The dispositive rules, on the other hand, are only valid if the 
parties did not give another order, their validity can therefore be excluded 
45 Cf. László Buza: "In the international law of new spirit, opposite to the old, 
so-called classic internationnal law, the public spirit prevails (L. Buza's italics) ; this 
means the principle that in the course of creating and applying the norms of inter-
national law the public interests of community are to be taken as a basis and not 
the separate interests of the single States." (A nemzetközi jog fő kérdései az új szel-
lemű nemzetközi jogban) (Principal problems of international law in the inter-
national law of new spirit). Budapest, 1967, p. 17. 
46 Quoted by G. Tunkin: Op. cit., p. 289. 
47 Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale dix-septième session, A/G. 
6./L, 505. 
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with a different agreement.48 To apply the concepts of internal law to inter-
national law relations without any change is mostly not without any problem. 
The concept of dispositive and cogent norms in internal law is not an exception 
of that, either.49 In the municipal law, above the subjects of law there is a 
legislator tha t can prescribe a conduct compulsorily or can complete any 
deficiensy of law. The dispositive or cogent character of the manifestat ion of 
its will asserts itself in the course of the application of láw. Thus, e. g., a legal 
court will regard as valid the disposition of a contract in civil law tha t depar ts 
f rom that of a legal norm depending on whether that norm is of dispositive or 
cogent character. In international law there is no power like that above the 
States. The States may bring about, on principle in any problem, wi th bilateral 
or part icular provisions special legal norms that are binding them similarly to 
the norms of the universal international law and, in the course of the execution 
of international law, are to be considered both by the single States and by the 
international courts of justice as positive rules tha t cannot be departed f rom. 
In this sense Ferenc Márkus is right as he writes tha t " the fundamen ta l 
method of regulation (in international law) is to establish the cogent norms".50 
In international law, however, if we apply correctly the analogy obtained f rom 
the internal law, the existence of ius cogens arises not on the level of execution 
but on that of legislation. That is to say, it raises the problem if there are rules 
of the universal international law tha t cannot be overruled by a bilateral or 
part icular creation of law. The existence of ius cogens means, therefore, tha t 
there are some norms in international law obligating the States even in spite 
of their will, without their consent , by express terms or by implication. And 
if they depart f rom these norms in their bilateral relations ther? these depart ing 
norms will be null and void and the norms of cogent character will take up 
the place of them. The existence of ius cogens manifests itself, therefore , in 
the restriction of the f reedom of- t reaty making by States. This f reedom, ho-
wever, is to be considered as one of the fundamenta l manifestations of State 
sovereignty. Accordingly, it is easy to understand that the international juris-
prudence for a long time definitely opposed the existence of ius cogens, seeing 
in it a serious restriction of State sovereignty. Thus for instance, G. Guggen-
heim was establishing: "Entsprechend dem bereits an anderer Stelle erwähnten 
.grundsätzlich-dispositiven Charakter allen Völkerrechts, besteht keinerlei Be-
grenzung des möglichen Inhalts völkerrechtlicher Verträge. Es gibt ke ine Regel, 
auf deren Grundlage zwingendes von nicht-zwingendem Völkerrecht un te r -
schieden werden könnte oder der zufolge ein Verstoß gegen die guten Sit ten 
als Völkerrechtsverletzung zu betrachten wäre."51 The existence of the ius 
cogens is rejected also by G. Schwarzenberger with the explanation tha t 
J\ . . jus cogens, as distinct f rom jus dispositivum, presupposes the existence of 
48 Cf.: Világhy—Eörsi: Magyar polgári jog (Hungarian civil :;law), vol. I. Buda-
pest; 1962, p. 73. 
49 Ferenc Márkus puts it still more sharply, establishing that ".. . the internal 
legal concept of dispositive and cogent norms cannot be applied in international law 
-at all or only with some reservations". (Cf.: Jus cogens and jus dispositivum a nem-
zetközi jogban [Ius cogens and ius dispositivum in international law]). In: "Állam- és 
Jogtudomány" (Political Science and Jurisprudence. Budapest), 1967, vol. X, pp. 
212—213. 
»> Op. cit., p. 213. 
51 Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Basel, 1948, Bd. I, p. 56.. 
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a n effective de jure order, which has at its disposal legislative and judicial 
rriachinery able to formulate rules of public policy, and, in the last resort, can 
rely on overwhelming physical force. Unorganised international, society lacks 
such organs'-.52 The restriction of the freedom of t reaty of States is rejected 
by the Havanna Convention on treaties, 1928. as well, its Article. 18 declaring: 
"Two or more States can agree that their relations are to be governed by rules 
other than those established in general conventions celebrated by them with 
other States."53 The traditional conception sees, therefore, in the norms of uni-
versal character in international law exclusively dispositive rules tha t are effec-
tive only if there is no conflicting particular or regional legal norm. László 
Buza-is writing, in connection with that, as follows: "In international law, by 
the nature of that law, their is no ius cogens . . . The States, as a result of their 
sovereignty, may arrange freely their mutual connections between themselves 
provided tha t the arrangement does not violate any obligations of them 
existing in the relation of a third State."54 This point of view involves, however, 
-some inconsistency. It is namely questionable what is the na ture of the rule 
which the prohibition of some obligation subsisting towards a third State is 
. based upon. Although in this connection the author is thinking that " the res-
triction isn't a result of a higher ius cogens in this case, either, but it is based 
on the prohibition of violating an obligation accepted legally by the State 
itself"55 — it is probable that a t rea ty that is in contradiction wi th an obligation 
based on a t reaty or the customary law for a third State, must be regarded as 
illegal even if this previously created legal rule does not contain any disposition 
depriving the contracting parties of the right to undertake any contrary obli-
gations in international law towards other States. In a case like tha t — if there 
is at all a rule forbidding the creation of a law that is at variance with a legal 
obligátion towards a foreign State — tha t prohibition can be cased only on a 
cogent norm of general character that cannot be excluded with a bilateral 
legislation. The possible existence of norms of this na túré has appeared, in 
fact, in the jurisprudènce of international law very early.. To be sure, the 
theory of natural law did not distinguish, as yet, cogent norms f rom those of 
other character, the unchangeability of international law considered to have 
the character of natural law was self-evident.56 A later opinion that deduced 
international law f rom the agreement of the States is starting, as mentioned 
before — f rom the (in principle unrestricted) freedom of the States to enter 
treaties, considering that to bè a criterion of sovereignty and, sometimes, even 
to be a State.57 Sometimes, howerer, like a remainder of the conception of 
na tura l law, we meet not only in the jurisprudence but also is the international 
jurisdiction, some opinions that, s tar t ing f rom certain (often moral) bases,. 
52 A Manual of International Law. London,. 1967, pp. 29—30. 
53 Cf.: American Journal of International Law, 1935. Supplement, pp. 1205 sqq. 
54 Op, cit., p. 36. . " • • : . .' 
55 L. Buza: Op. cit., p. 36. 
56 Cf.: M. Schweitzer: Jus-cogens im Völkerrecht. Archiv des Völkerrechts. 15. 
Bd., 1971. p. 198. ... 
57 Cf., e. g., A. S. Çustamante y Sirven: ":.. On doit considérer comme personne 
••juridique internationale toute société humaine civilisée, souveraine d'un territoire, 
avec un gouvernement- propre organisé" qui ait dans ses fonctions la représentation 
extérieure et le droit de conclure des traites": internationaux." : (Droit International 
Public. Tome I, Paris, 1934, p. 121.) - • : 
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establish some obligations of States even without the manifestation of their 
will. For example, W. Schiicking, in his dissenting opinion delivered in the 
Oscar Chin-case, 1934, emphasized the possibility of the existence of rules of 
cogent nature, establishing in the event, so to say for an example : "The Court 
would never, for instance, apply a convention the terms of which were 
contrary to public morality."58 The at t i tude of the International Court of Justice 
concerning the ius cogens is ambiguous. First it established in an advisory 
opinion about some reservations connected with the Convention of Genocide: 
"Il est bien établie qu 'un Etat ne peut, dans ses rapports conventionnels, être 
lié sans son consentement et qu'en conséquence aucune réserve ne lui est 
opposable tant qu'il n 'a pas donné son assentiment."59 Later on, in the same 
opinion the Court held tha t ". . . les principles qui sont à la base de la Con-
vention sont des principles reconnus par les nations civilisées comme obligeant 
les Etats même en dehors de tout lien conventionnel".60 And of late, Justice 
Kotaro Tanaka assumed the point of view in the Continental Shelf Cases tha t 
the principle of equal distance was of cogent character as a principle of deli-
mitation.61 The recognition of the existence of ius cogens keeps spreading more 
and more in the international jurisprudence, as well.62 And since the Vienna 
Convention, 1969, codifying the law of treaties, the problem has lef t the domain 
of the theory of law and jurisprudence, and has become a rule of positive law. 
Article 53 of the Convention mentioned is namely declaring: "A t reaty is void 
if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law." The existence of the ius cogens is referred to also by Article 
64 of the Convention mentioned.63 The discussion about the existence of legal 
rules with the na ture of ius cogens has, therefore, already been decided by the 
positive international law.. But a number of problems has nevertheless remained 
open. It is true, for example, that the Convention mentioned is declaring tha t 
" . . . a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a no rm 
f rom which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character"64 — 
58 PCI, Series A/B, No. 63, 1934, p. 150. 
59 Réserves à la Convention sur le génocide, Avis consultatif: С. I. J. Recueil 
1951, p. 21. 
60 Op. cit., p. 23. 
61 "However, if a reservation were concerned with the equidistance principle, it 
would not necessarily have a negative affect upon the formation of customary inter-
national law. because in this case the reservation would in itself be null and void as 
contrary to an essential principle of the continental shelf institution which mpst be 
recognized as jus cogens" (North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports. 
1969, p. 182). 
62 Cf. е. д., G. Fitzmaurice: The General Principles of International Law conside-
red from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law. Recueil des Cours 1957. Tome 92, p. 
120, J. H. W. Verzijl: International Law in Historical Perspective. Leyden 1968. Vol. 
I, pp. 77 sqq., A. Verdross: Jus dispositivum and Jus cogens in International Law. 
AJIL 1966, pp. 55 sqq., M. Virally: Réflexions sur le "jus cogens". Annuaire Français 
de Droit International. 1966, pp. 5—29, G. Tunkin: Op. cit., pp. 116—122, Hanna Bokor 
—Szégô: New States and International Law. Budapest, 1970, pp. 64—70. 
63 "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing 
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. (As to the 
text of treaties, cf.: AJIL. 1969, pp. 875—903.) 
64 See Article 53 of the Treaty. 
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but it does not enumerate these norms in a concrete way, and also the special 
l i terature of international law is very careful with enumerations.60 
But for investigating the responsibility in international law, it is no t 
necessary to go into fu r the r details of this question. The fact itself that there 
are norms of cogent na ture answers the question why we cannot regard t h e 
responsibility in international law as a legal relations merely between two 
States, resp.: why it cannot be identified with either the liability in civil l aw 
or tha t in criminal law. The norms of international law with the na ture of ius 
cogens — as referred to by the jurisprudence, as well — are eventually no 
rules of superior quality. They are quite simply some norms expressing t h e 
public interest of States that cannot be amended with a praticular or bi lateral 
creation of law, that is to say, their amendment can take place only with norms, 
of general character.66 In case of violating the norms considered to be cogent, 
the offending State f inds itself face to face with the whole international com-
munity. It is something similar to the social dangerousness in criminal law. 
In that case, the violation of law is no more the affair of the violating and 
violated States. It is an internat ional delict that violates the common interest 
of every State. Therefore, on one side of the legal relationship there is standing 
the whole international community.67 And in the gravest case — viz. if the 
violated rule is a cogent norm prescribing the prohibition of war — also t h e 
procedure against the violating State hás the character of public force. On t h e 
other hand, if the illegal behaviour has violated for example a bilateral com-
mercial agreement and, as a result of that , the other par ty has suffered some 
material damage then the responsibility for that is much more similar to the 
liability in civil law without being identical with it. As in the normative order 
of international law the single formations of responsibility are not separated 
f rom one another, as yet; and wha t in internal law are manifested separately 
as liabilities of civil law, labour law, criminal law, etc., in international law do 
appear for the t ime being as a uni form system of responsibility: it is obvious 
that it would be thoroughly needless to insist on any analogy with the peculiar 
responsibility formation of any branch of internal law. We must agree with 
D. Anzilotti who sees being some similarity to the responsibility types occurring 
in internal law but, he writes, " . . . l a veritá á che nei rapport i interstatuali 
65 Thus, e. g., according to I. Brownlie there are like these the rules prohibiting 
aggressive war, the law of genocide, trade in slaves, piracy, other crimes against 
humanity, and the principle of self-determination. (Cf.: Principles of Public Inter-
national Law. Oxford, 1966, p. 417.) It is rightly established by Hanna Bokor—Szegő, 
mentioning similar principles (the principle of non-aggression, the peaceful sett-
lement of disputes, the freedom .of the high seas) that the norms of this nature also 
may change in their content (Cf.: Op. cit., p. 70), that is to say, there would be not 
possible at all to give an enumeration valid for any time. 
66 Cf., e. g., the statement of Géza Herczegh who is declaring, speaking of the 
jus cogens: "Here is a case not of principles or rules of a superior order, or legally 
stronger, but one of the settlement of problems of universal interest, which can be 
brought under regulation only by universal rules." (General Principles of Law and 
the International Legal Order. Budapest, 1969, p. 77.) 
67 A similar point of view is contained in a Manual of International Law, 
published in the U. S. S. R., dividing the violátions of international law into two 
groups: those violating only the rights of a single State, and those graver violations 
of law that are directed against all the States. (Cf.: Kurs mezhdurarodnogo prava. 
Moskva. 1969, vol. V, pp. 420—421 and 434—435.) The same opinion is represented by 
D. B. Levin: Op. cit., pp. 20—21 and 38—39, G. Tunkin: Op. cit., pp. 288—289. 
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Tion abbiamo ne una responsabilita penale ne una responsabilita civile; abb iamo 
semplicemente -una responsabilita di diritto internazionale".68 
Another component of the legal liability is tha t the responsibility only 
takes • place if the violation of law can be imputed to a subject of law. The 
problem to be examined is, therefore, what imputabil i ty means in internat ional 
law. Imputabil i ty in the internal law of States is mostly based on culpability. 
In connection with the responsibility of States in international law, the inter-
national jurisprudence could not bring about sofar a uni form point of view. 
Both the theory of culpability and that of objective liability have their own 
-partisans. 
The problem of culpability — as noticed by the Italian expert of in ter-
nat ional law, R. Ago — is one of the most interesting and most com-
plicated problems of the general theory of international law.69 The founding 
of the theory of culpability is generally at t r ibuted to H. Grotius who made it 
-clear tha t the communities — both States and other communities, as well —• 
are not responsible without their own action or omission for the acts of the 
individuals.70 This opinion, that is reflecting the influence of Roman law, 
predominated in the field of the international jurisprudence till the Nineteenth 
Century and was represented by Pufendorf , Ch. Wolff, E. Vattel, and others. 
The principle of culpability is accepted by H. Triepel, too, according to whom 
t h e state responsibility for the acts of individuals can belong to two types lying 
•on thoroughly different bases: one of them is the obligation to repair , the 
-other one the obligation to give statisfaction to the offended party,71 the lat ter 
one, however, can take place without culpability, too.72 Thus Triepel, even if 
l ie has not thoroughly abandoned the conception of culpability, made some 
concession for objective liability. Anzilotti, on the other hand, criticizing the 
-theory of culpability, referred to tha t the theory of culpability in international 
law is a result of the influence of Roman law. But as we can only speak of 
malice or negligence in connection with individuals, both of them can be con-
nected only with persons or organs acting for the State.73 An act of a state 
functionary, on the other hand, may be qualified in a given case as a violation, 
of international law, the State being responsible for it, although the funct ionary 
;is not guilty and his act does not violate any internal law, either.74 Anzilotti 's 
theory of objective responsibility has gained several adherents. Thus it is 
1 08 D. Anzilotti: Teoria Generale délia Responsabilité, p. 101. 
69 R. Ago: Das Verschulden im völkerrechtlichen Unrecht. Zeitschrift für öf-
fentliches Recht. Bd. 20. 1940, p. 449. 
70 Hugo Grotius: A háború és béke jogáról (De iure belli ac pacis), vol. II. Buda-
pest, I960', p: 471. Grotius declares in a similar way in another place of his quoted 
work, as well: Thé rule that somebody is responsible without his own culpàbility, 
as well, for the acts of his personnel, is not based on international l a w . . . but. on 
the positivé internal law. (Op. cit., p. 353.) 
.71 H. Triepel: Völkerrecht und Landesrecht. Tübingen, 1907, p. 334. 
72 "Aus dër Handlung des Individuums kann nun aber dem Staate neben der 
Pflicht zur Reparation oder Ohne Sie die Pflicht erwachsen, den verletzten Genug-
tuung zu verschaffen. Diese Leistung ist nicht Inhalt einer. Deliktsobligation; sie ent-
steht auch ohne Schuld" (H.Triepel): Op.- cit., p. 335). -
73 Cf.: D. Anzilotti:..Cours de\ Droit International Tome I. Paris. 1929, pp. 
497—498. . • • : . . . . 
71 D. Anzilotti:, Cours de Droit International,, p. 500. , - . . 
.accepted by P. Guggenheim75 or the Hungarian István Kertész,76 as well, while 
•others adopt certain intermediate points of view. Thus for example I. Münch 
-entering into the details of the problem in his very fundamenta l and excellent 
work , takes the responsibility without culpability to be possible, too," establi-
sh ing also that ". . . es andererseits jedoch Fälle gibt, in denen erst das Vor-
handensein von Schuld ein Verhalten zum völkerrechtlichén Delikt werden 
lässt".'8 A similar mediatory standpoint is accepted by K. Furgler; according 
t o his opinion: "Das Völkerrecht . . . k e n n t weder eine reine Schuldtheorie, 
noch eine ausschliesslich objektive Verantwortl ichkéit der Staaten. '"9 The 
deba te is, anyway, not decided et- all by sett ing up the theory of objective 
responsibility. In l i terature rather the adherents of the theory of culpability 
have so fa r been in majori ty. That is the opinion, for example, of A. Verdross,80 
•G. Dahm81 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht8 2 and of others,83 as well. . 
The International Court of Justice — although not quite unequivocally —• 
assumed the point of view of culpability. In the Kor fu Channel Case — inves-
t igating the problem if Albania is responsible for the explosion on mines of 
the English warships in the Albanian terri torial waters — The Court held: 
"Il est vrai, ainsi que le démontre la prat ique internationale, qu 'un Etat, sur 
le territoire duquel s'est produit un acte contraire en droit international, peut 
•être invité à s'en expliquer. Il est également vrai qu'il ne peut se dérober à 
cette invitation en se bornant à répondre qu'il ignore les circonstances de cet 
.acte ou ses auteurs. Il peut, jusqu'à un certain point, ê tre tenu de fournir des 
indications sur l 'usage qu'il a fait des moyens d ' information et d'enquête à sa 
75 Die Organhaftung ist stets Kausal — und nicht Schuldhaftung (P. Guggen-
heim: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Basel. 1951. Bd. II, p. 558.) 
76 "Although we may reason about that a State may or may not be blamed 
because of an error, ommission or, if you like it, guilt at, or because of, the violation 
<of an international obligation. But the international responsability is not induced by 
the error, the ommission but by the objective fact of having violated the norms of 
international law." (István Kertész: Áz állam nemzetközi jogi felelőssége.) (Respon-
sibility of the State in international law.) Budapest, 1938, p. 193. 
77 "Ein völkerrechtliches Delikt kann durchaus auch dann gegeben sein, wenn 
kein Verschulden vorliegt" (Ingo von Münch: Das völkerrechtliche Delikt. Frankfurt 
am Main, 1963, p. 163). 
78 Op. cit. pp. 160—161. 
79 K. Furgler: Grundprobleme der völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit der 
Staaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Haager Kodifikationskonferenz, sowie 
•der Praxis der Vereinigten Staaten und der Schweiz. Zürich, 1948, p. 96. 
80 "Nach den allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätzen besteht aber kein Zweifel darüber, 
dass die Erfolgshaftung nur für einzelne Arten von Beschädigungen anerkannt ist, 
•während grundsätzlich eine Verantwortlichkeit nur angenommen wird, wenn der 
Schaden entweder vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig verursacht wurde" (A. Verdross: Völ-
kerrecht, Wien, 1959, p. 300). 
81 "Sofern nichts anderes vertraglich vereinbart worden ist, sind die Staaten nur 
dann zur Entschädigung und Wiedergutmachung verpflichtet, wenn ihre Organe 
vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig handeln" (G. Dahm: Völkerrecht. Stuttgart, 1961. 3d. 
III, p. 228). 
82 "An act of a State injurious to-another State is nevertheless not an inter-
national delinquency if committed neither wilfully and maliciously nor with culpable 
negligence." (International Law. London—New York—Toronto. Seventh ed. Vol. I, 
p. 311.) 
83 Thus, e. g., culpability is considered to be necessary by P. Fauchille: Le fait 
d'un Etat n'entraine la responsabilité de celui-ci que s'il constitue une faute, c'est-à-
dire s'il est illicite." (Traité de Droit International Public. Tome Ier, part 1. Paris, 
: 1922, .p. 515.) . 
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disposition. Mais on ne saurai t conclure du seul contrôle exercé par u n Etat 
sur son territoire terrestre ou sur ses eaux territoriales que cet Etat a néces-
sairement connu ou dû connaître tout fai t illicite international qui y a é t é 
perpétré non plus qu' i l a nécessairement connu ou dû connaître ses auteurs . 
En soi, et indépendamment d 'autres circonstances, ce fai t ne justifie ni respon-
sabilité prima facie ni déplacement dans le fa rdeau de la preuve."84 The Court , 
therefore, did not establish the responsibility of Albania on the basis of t h e 
mere fact that the accident had taken place on the. terri torial waters of Albania 
but it presumed that Albania should have k n o w n about the existence of t h e 
minefield,85 and as she had omitted to w a r n t he English ships, "ces graves 
omissions engagent la responsabilité internationale de l'Albanie".80 To be sure, 
in the decision of the Court it was not declared expressis verbis that the bas is 
of the responsibility was the culpable behaviour of Albania, it could be conclu-
ded f rom the formulat ions quoted. On the other hand, although it was n o t 
proved that Albania had actually know about the existence of minefield, t h a t 
was nevertheless presumed f r o m the fact of the Albanian sovereignty over t h e 
terri tory. This comprises implicitely that the responsibility may be established 
on the basis of the fact of territorial sovereignty, even without the culpabil i ty 
being proved. The decision of the Court is, therefore, not entirely unequivocal 
as to the problem of culpability. In some dissenting opinions annexed to t h e 
decision is, however, quite unequivocally expressed the principle tha t t h e 
responsibility of a State can only be established on the basis of culpability. 
Thus, e. g., it is established in the dissenting opinion of the Soviet Judge of 
the. International Court of Justice, S. Krylov: "La responsabilité de l 'Etat 
résultant d 'un délit international présuppose au moins une faute de la pa r t d e 
cet Etat. On ne peut pas baser la responsabilité internationale de l 'Etat s u r 
l 'argument qu'un fa i t imputé à cet Etat a eu lieu sur son terri toire — terrestre,, 
mari t ime ou aérien. On ne peut pas transposer dans le domaine du droit i n t e r -
national la théorie du risque développée dans le droit civil interne de plusieurs 
pays. Pour fonder la responsabilité de l'Etat, il f au t donc recourir à la no t ion 
de faute."87 The principle of objective liability was refused by B. Winiarski, as 
well, establishing in his dissenting opinion that a State cannot be held respon-
sible only for on its terr i tory an act violating international law was committed.8* 
In his opinion, a Sta te is only responsible for an illegal act if it was committed 
by it, if it lef t undone the precautionary measures necessary to prevent t h e 
illegal act, or if it omitted to make a search for, and to punish, the pe rpe t ra to r s 
of acts like these.89 Similarly, the culpability is held to be the basis of respon-
sibility by the dissenting opinions of Justices Ph. Azevedo,90 Badawi,91 and 
84 Affaire du Détroit de Corfou. Arrêt du 9 avril 1949, C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 18. 
85 "... la Cour tire la conclusion que le mouillage du champ de mines, qui a 
provoqué les explosions du 22 octobre 1946, n'a pas pu échapper à la connaissance 
du Gouvernement albanais. (Ibid., p. 22.) 
86 C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 23. 
87 C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 72. 
88 C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 53. 
89 C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 52. 
90 According to Azevedo, the negligence of the riparian State is involving its 
responsibility. (C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 94.) 
91 Badawi declares: ". . . i l n'existe pas à la charge de l'Albanie une faute quel-
conque qui aurait causé l'explosion et sur laquelle serait éventuellement fondée sa 
responsabilité internationale pour le dommage subi." At the same place he declares 
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Ecer,92 as well. As the International Court of Justice has not taken the part 
unambiguously either pro or contra the culpable responsibility and, overmore, 
the problem has not been interpreted quite unequivocally in the practice of 
States, either, it is easy to understand that it led to serious debates in the 
•course of codification, as well. 
At the session of the International Law Institute at Lausanne, 1927, in the 
•course of negotiating the Dra f t about the responsibility of States, the reporter 
of the Draf t took the view tha t a State is only responsible if the violation of an 
obligation in international law resulted f rom the culpability of its organs,93 
while N. Politis, A. de Lapradelle, Le Fur and others were of the opinion that 
they should not take sides in this question as the legal science itself was 
divided in that respect.94 Ch. De Visscher thought that the theory of culpability 
w a s saturated with psychological elements that were to be excluded f rom the 
•domain of international law; the theory of risk, however, would go too fa r in 
his opinion; therefore, he considered to be the best solution to presume gene-
rally the responsibility of State, determining anyway the exact conditions of 
its being exempted f r o m the responsibility.95 In the course of the codification 
procedure of the League of Nations, neither the Guerrero-Report nor the so-
called "Bases of discussion" took the part of the culpability or the objective 
liability. They simply confined themselves to declare tha t the international 
responsibility was the consequence of an illegal act originated f rom the viola-
tion of a treaty or of the international customary law.96 This solution — as it 
does not examine the existence of culpability — is leaning ra ther to the ob-
jective liability while other drafts , mainly those of private character, in con-
nection with the responsibility in international law do require, on the contrary, 
the culpable liability. The situation is like this in case of the Dra f t made by 
t h e Japanese section of ILA.97 And a chapter of the Draf t made by the Inter-
American Law Commision in .1962 expressly rejects the objective respon-
sibility.98 
further: "... le droit international ne connait pas la responsabilité objective ..." (C. I. 
J. Recueil, 1949, p. 65). 
93 According to the opinion of the Czechoslovak Justice, B. Ecer, the judgement 
would have had to declare that "... la responsabilité d'un Etat suppose de sa part 
soit dolus soit culpa" (Italics in the original text. C. I. J. Recueil, 1949, p. 127). 
93 See Article 3 of the original Draft of Strisower: „L'Etat n'est responsable que 
si l'inobservation de l'obligation internationale est la conséquence d'une faute de ses 
organes" (Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, Session de Lausanne, 1927. 
Tome III, p. 103). 
04 Cf.: ibidem, p. 103—106. 
95 Cf. : Annuaire, p. 106. 
96 Cf., e. g., Item 1 of the Conclusions summed up by G. Guerrero or the Basis 
•of Debate No. 7 (Annuaire de la Commission de droit international, 1956. Vol. II, pp. 
222—223). 
97 "A State is responsible for injuries suffered by aliens within its territories, 
in life, person or property through wilful act, default or negligence of the official 
authorities in the discharge of their official functions, if such act, default or neg-
ligence constitutes a violation of international duty resting upon the State to which 
the said authorities belong" (The International Law Association, Report of the thirty-
fourth Conference, London, 1927, p. 382). 
98 "La théorie du risque n'est pas admissible comme fondement de la responsa-
bilité internationale" (Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1969. Vol. 
II, p. 159). 
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The problem of culpability was under a great discussion in the I n t e r n a -
tional Law Commission of the U. N. O., as well, in the course of codification.. 
Although the reporter of the question, Garcia Amador, qualified the problem, 
of the culpability — together with other problems — a pure theoretical p r o b -
lem,90 but that was strongly discussed by some members of the Commission. 
Thus for example the Japanese member of the Commission, K. Yokota saw 
the problems of culpability and causality being important for solving the-
concrete questions,100 as ". . . dans la plupart des causes la responsabilité in te r -
nationale résulte d 'une faute. Inversement, c'est un principe de droit in te r -
nationale bien établi que toutes les fois, où une fau te est imputable à un Etat , 
sa responsabilité internationale est engagée".101 In the course of the debate, the-
culpability was considered necessary for establishing the responsibility of State-
by S. B. Krylov102 and C. Salamanca,103 as well, while others, e. g., Padil la 
Nervo were of a different opinion. They thought that it would be a wrong 
idea to maintain the traditional theory of culpability in the age of the m a -
nufac ture of nuclear weapons because, for instance, the damages caused by~ 
the experimental explosions involve the international responsibility of States 
without speaking of culpability and even of the violation of an international: 
obligation.10'4 E. Sandström suggested a mixed system, similarly to the solution, 
of the internal laws in the most States105 while according to Sir Gerald F r i t z -
maurice it would be the best to speak, instead of culpability, of imputabi l i ty 
(l'imputabilité).106 
It is actually not easy to apply the concept of culpability or — using the-
expression of criminal law — of guilt in international law. As culpability or 
guilt means a psychic connection between the individual and the act of o f f e n -
der, a psychic connection because of which the illegal act can be imputed t o 
him:107 this concept may be raised, therefore, only in the relation of physical, 
persons. As regards the responsibility of State,, there arises the problem, w h e -
ther or not the State as an abstract juristic person, as a geographico-political: 
unit can be declared guilty in the violation of an international legal norm, 
taking into consideration that the violation of the international obligation is-
usually committed by some state organ as a public body or by some funct io-
nary.103 If we consider the State to be responsible only if the person acting in 
its name committed a voluntary or negligent violation of law, immediately 
arises the question, too, on the basis of which law the responsibility is to be; 
99 Cf.: Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1957, I, p. 164. 
100 Cf.: Annuaire, 1957, I, p. 170. 
101 Ibidem. 
J02 Cf.: Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1956, I, p. 261. 
103 Ibidem. 
m Annuaire, 1957. I, p. 166. 
105 Annuaire, 1956. I, p. 261. 
J°6 Annuaire, 1957. I, p. 174. 
107 "Culpability is accordingly a psychic relation connecting the perpetrator to-
the socially dangerous act committed by him, expressed in the-form of deliberateness 
or negligence, because of which his act is imputable to him" (Kádár, M.—Kálmán, 
Gy.: A büntetőjog általános tanai [General theory of criminal law]. Budapest, 1966, 
p. 416). . 
los This thought is conceived by H. Kelsen as follows: "Schuld, des Staates kann 
immer nur Schuld von Menschen sein, deren schuldhaftes Verhalten dem Staat zu-
gerechnet wird." (H. Kelsen; Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge im Völkerrecht. Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht. Bd. XII. 1932, p. 538.) 
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investigated f i rs t : the internal or international law. The act of an individual' 
acting for the State can violate the law on principle in three ways: 
(1) The act is violating only the internal law of a State. This case does not. 
belong to our interests, being not evaluative according to international law-
(2) The act is conflicting both with the internal and the international-law.. 
(3) The act (behaviour) is a violation of international law without conflic-
ting with the internal law of a State. 
Let us see the second case when a state funct ionary is voluntarily violating-
his official duties prescribed by the internal law committing, at the same time,, 
by that act also the violation of international law against a foreign State. (Sup-
posing tha t in a typical case the internal law of a State is not conflicting with, 
the obligations under taken .by the State in international law then this is the-
most f requent case because, in case of a harmony between the two laws, the-
internal law of a State must not prescribe any conduct that is lawful according 
to the internal law but prohibited, by international law.) In a case like this, 
the culpability of the State could only, be established on the basis of culpa in. 
eligendo the act of the funct ionary being not identical with the state will o r 
his culpability with that of the State. The state will is otherwise not expressed 
by the individual decisions but by the legal rules that these decisions are based 
on. If, therefore, a State is prohibiting its authorities f rom billeting its troups: 
on the residences of foreign diplomats in times of war but that is nevertheless 
ordained in a concrete case by an official, on what basis the State should be 
responsible for an act that is prohibited by its own internal law, taking the re -
fore place in spite of its general will. A State can be held responsible o n 
principle for the state acts carried out by its organs, the illegal acts are, ho-
wever, no state acts — as it is established by H. Kelsen.109 Leaving now out of 
consideration the application of culpa in eligendo, that is of higly equivocal 
value in international law (as to be seen later on), then the acts attributable-
to the State must be restricted to the acts carried out in a way prescribed by 
the internal law by a person acting for the State that, however, mean, at t h e 
same time, the violation of an obligation in international law towards foreign, 
States. This supposes, a t any rate, an internal legislative, procedure that is in. 
contradiction with the rules of international law, at which an individual deci-
sion inducing a concrete violation of law is, in fact, not necessary any more.: 
If, namely, there is prescribed or made possible a procedure for a state organ? 
by the internal law of a State the performence of which is resulting necessarily 
in the violation of an international obligation, it is in itself a basis for the-
responsibility of the State in international law.110 ' 1 
The theory exposed above is, however, not followed unequivocally by t h e 
109 Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge im Völkerrecht, p. 539. 
110 As referred to also by the literature of international law, if the State is 
responsible for the acts carried out by its organs, then it follows of that-logically 
that the State is responsible for the acts of legislation, as well. (Cf.: E. Vitta: La-
responsabilità'internazionale dello stato per gli atti legislativi. Milano, 1953, p. 25.) 
The responsibility of State for the legislative acts is declared also in the Basis for-
debate No. 2 elaborated at the Conference of The Hague: "La responsabilité de .l'Etat! 
se trouve engagée si le .dommage subi'par un' étranger résulte soit du fait que l'Etat 
a adopté des dispositions législatives incompatiblés avec les obligations internationales; 
existant à sa charge, en vertu de traités ou un autre titre, soit du fait que l'Etat a/ 
négligé d'adopter les dispositions législatives nécessaires à l'exécution de ces obli-
gations." „ •' ' ' 
practice of States. According to this theory, namely, if a funct ionary acting as 
a state organ, transgressing its competence, that is acting in a way contrary 
to the internal law is performing a conduct tha t is, a t the same time, a viola-
t ion of an obligation towards a foreign State in international law, then this 
fact in itself would release the State f rom its obligation, taking into considera-
t ion that the s ta te funct ionary has acted contrary to the law of the State, tha t 
is to say, contrary to its expressed will. In the l i terature of international law 
w e are actually f inding the adherents of this — f rom theoretical point of view 
— attractive and plausible opinion,111 but it is hotly debated in the legal lite-
rature, as well112 and there wasn' t assumed, so far , any unequivocal position 
either by the international practice or the codification in this question. 
In the state practice there may be found several cases where no responsi-
bility was accepted by a State for acts inducing a violation of the law of other 
"States, committed by their functionaries illegally, transgressing their compe-
tence or abusing their authority. The acts of this na ture are named ul t ra vires 
ac ts in the l i terature of international law.113 As for instance an English subject, 
named Tunstall, was illegally shot by a sheriff , the American Secretary of 
State, Bayard, answer ing . the British diplomatic step, declared: "The United 
States could not be responsible for what was not a n act of the Government . 
I t was executed . . . in opposition to its laws and in violation of i ts peace".114 
On the other hand, there a re in the practice also cases where the s ta te 
official acted obviously unlawfully, his State nonetheless accepted the responsi-
bility. Thus for instance, a Bavarian revenue officer, M. Brandner, persuaded 
some juvenile persons to kidnap a German citizen a war ran t for the ar res t of 
whom had been issued in the German Federal Republic for stealing a motor-car-
but who was then staying in Austria. The wanted thief was really kidnapped 
in Austria, carried through the border into the German Federal Republic and 
then arrested by Brandner. An official exchange of diplomatic notes took place 
between Austria and the German Federal Republic, Austria qualified the act 
kidnapping and the GFR apologized115 what proves, at any rate, that the Ger-
m a n Federal Republic accepted the responsibility for an unauthorized act com-
mitted obviously illegally by a functionary of it. 
A similar uncertainty manifested itself in this question in the course of 
the codification, too. G. Guerrero, in his Report made for the Codification 
Conference at The Hague, is essentially excluding a responsibility for the u l t ra 
111 Here is first of all H. Kelsen to be mentioned. See, for instance, apart from 
his works quoted, his paper "Collective and individual responsibility for acts of State 
in international law" (The Jewish Yearbook of International Law. Jerusalem, 1948). 
112 Thus, e. g., it is established by K. Strupp: "Ein Staat haftet für die kompe-
tenzwidrigen Handlungen seiner Organe ohne Rücksicht auf deren Verschulden, nach 
•dem Prinzip der Erfolgshaftung." {K. Strupp: Das völkerrechtliche Delikt. Handbuch 
des Völkerrechts. Bd. III. Berlin, 1920, p. 52.) I. Kertész is similarly declaring: "Be-
sides emphasizing the previous and compulsory applying for every internal legal sid, 
we find that the establishment of international responsibility in case of the ultra 
vires actions of the functionaries committed in their official quality is in full har-
mony with the general principles of international law." (Op. cit., p. 144.) K. Furgler 
"has a similar opinion, as well (Op. cit., pp. 25—26). 
113 Cf. connectedly: Th. Mer on: International responsibility of States for unau-
thorized acts of their officials. The British Year Book of International Law. Oxford, 
1957, p. 86. 
114 Cf. the case quoted and other examples: Th. Meron: Op. cit. pp. 90—92. 
1J5 Cf.: Ingo Münch: Op. cit., pp. 176—177. 
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vires acts. The State is only responsible for these: (1) if it had known about 
the preparations and did not prevent them, (2) if it has omitted to • call his 
functionary to account for the illegal act executed, and finally (3) if the offen-
ded foreign citizen has no possibility for a legal procedure against the guilty 
functionary, resp. if the local legal courts denied him the possibility of legal 
remedies prescribed by the internal law.110 
It is quite abvious tha t the basis of responsibility in the three cases men-
tioned is no more the (ultra vires) act committed illegally by the functionary 
but the omission of . the State failing purposely to impede him in doing it or 
omitting to punish h im for it, etc. 
"Base de discussion" No. 12 is restricting the responsibility to the acts 
committed within the competence if they are at the same time violations of 
international law, as well.117 At any rate, Base of discussion No. 13 is declaring : 
"La responsabilité de l 'Etat se t rouve engagée si le dommage subi par u n 
étranger résulte d'actes accomplis par ses fonctionnaires, même en dehors de 
leur compétence mais en s 'autorisant de leur qualité officielle lorsque ces actes 
sont contraires aux obligations internationales de l'Etat."118 
The Draf t prepared in the Conference of The Hague, however, is expressly 
holding the State liable for a violation of international law committed against 
a foreigner by a state funct ionary outside his competence but pretending to 
act in official quality except the case "si l 'incompétence du fonctionnaire était 
si manifeste que l 'étranger devait s 'en rendre compte et pouvait de ce fait, 
éviter le dommage".119 Similarly, also the Draf t of the International Law Insti-
tute f rom 1927 is holding the State responsible for the acts ultra vires, declaring 
in Article One: "Cette responsabilité de l 'Etat existe, soit que ses organes aient 
agi conformément, soit qu'ils agi contrairement, à la loi ou à l 'ordre d 'une 
autorité supérieure." — "Elle existe également lorsque ces organes agissent en 
dehors de leur compétence en se couvrant de leur qualité d'organes de l 'Etat et 
en se servant des moyens mis, à ce titre, à leur disposition." In t he course of 
the codification continued in the f ramework of the United Nations Organization, 
G. Amador was repeating in his Report Two essentially the Dra f t of The 
Hague, viz. tha t the State is responsible for the acts of its functionaries com-
mitted outside of their competence, as well, if they committed them by 
pretending the official quality of their procedure, except if the lack of compe-
tence is quite, obvious.120 
But if the State could always be held responsible for the acts of its functio-
naries that mean a violation of international law but are legal according to 
the internal law and in some cases even for their illegal acts, too, then the 
theory of pure culpability could be upheld in the latter case on the basis of 
the principle culpa in eligendo. That means that the State is obliged to choose 
the persons performing the state acts in a way that they, acting in the state 
organs, always proceed in compliance with the legal rules. But with what can 
it prove that it proceeded with due foresight at selecting the persons? That 
can' only be proved if the funct ionary in question proceeded lawful tha t is to 
116 Cf.: Conclusions du rapport de M. Guerrero, Item 4. (Annuaire de la Com-
mission du droit international, 1956, Vol. II, p. 223.) 
117 Cf. the Annuaire, quoted previously, Ibidem. 
118 Annuaire, Ibidem. 
119 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1956. Vol. II, p. 226. 
120 Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1957, II, p. 123. 
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say, it did not commit any violation of law. If the funct ionary committed a 
violation of international law tha t can be imputed t o the State, so it is proved 
by that tha t the State had committed an error in selection of tha t person.121 
But if we presume in any case like that the culpability in selection of the 
State, tha t is if we don't allow the State to exculpate iself f rom the responsi-
bility by proving that it did everything for selecting the most suitable person, 
then it seems to be needless to emphasize culpability. It is namely thoroughly 
improbable that a State could exculpate itself in this way f rom a violation of 
international law committed by a n ambassador, a police official or other organ 
of it, committed by the mentioned person ¡using his official quality, by proving 
to have been max imum careful in the selection of tha t person. If in peace-time 
a war ship is cannonading a foreign ship, if a bomb-carrier is bombing a 
foreign State, if a mili tary unit is crossing the border, it is hardly to be dispu-
ted that the State is responsible for that and there is, therefore, no room for 
exculpating it even if it proved any degres of diligence in selection and having 
actually no culpability, its organs acted quite independently of it and thoroughly 
arbitrarily. Consequently there seem those to be right in whose opinion not 
the concept of culpability is to be investigated first of all but instead of it the 
expression "imputabili ty" is to be used. 
When is a violation of international law imputable to a State? 
(1) If the violation of law in question has been committed by an organ of 
the State, and 
(2) if the committing funct ionary acted in his official quality or the act 
violating the international law was pretending that quali ty or misusing it. 
(3) There does not exist any circumstance excluding imputabili ty. (A cir-
cumstance like tha t is e. g., if the official person acted as a pr ivate person, if 
the lack of act ing legally is quite obvious.) Imputability is, therefore, essen-
tially the legal connection that exists between the State and its organs. Is the 
violation of international law moreover also a mater ia l damage, for establishing 
the responsibility fo r the damage is not enough to ascertain by the organ of 
which State the violation was committed. It is also necessary that a causal 
relation should exist between the violations of international law committed by 
the state organ and imputable to the State. The responsibility because of the 
violation of international law exists even if a causative relation is lacking but 
then there is no responsibility fo r damages (e. g., the damage was brought 
about by a n elemental disaster, vis maior). 
In some exceptional cases the responsibility of State is absolute (e. g., 
making use of atomic energy or in connection wi th space exploration) when 
there is needed no violation of law at all. Also in cases like these is causal 
relation necessary, and even it is of decisive importance. As, however, respon-
sibility takes place in absence of a violation of internat ional obligations, as 
well, the causal relation can therefore exist between the damage and a: conduct 
that is not qualified as a violation of internat ional law. This happens, fo r 
instance, in connection with the use of atomic energy where it is declared by 
I tem One, Article IV of the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear 
121 D. Anzilotti, criticizing the theory of the principle of culpa in eligendo, is 
rightly establishing that if a State committed a culpability like this in the election 
that is such a defect in the structure of the State for which it is anyway responsible. 
(Teoria Generate della Responsibilitá, p. 168—173.) 
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damage, 1963, tha t : "The liability of t he operator for nuclear damage under 
this Convention shall- be absolute."132 In cases like this, even if there is no 
violation of law, the imputabili ty is based on the connection between the 
nuclear activity and the damage wha t is proved suggestively by the conti-
nuation of Article IV of the Convention mentioned according to which the 
operator is relieved of the compensation if it is proved that the damage took 
place (1) owing to. the negligence of the person damaged, (2) as a result of a 
military conflict, civil war, (3) due to elemental disasters, (vis maior).123 
Although the dispositions of the Convention mentioned are arranging, in 
fact, not a responsibility in international law but one in civil iaw, also the 
procedure takes place before the competent legal court the territorial State 
according to the rules of the domestic law applied of the country, all this being 
prescribed by an international convention, it has yet an indirect influence on 
the responsibility in international law, as. well. If, for instance, a State does 
not execute the Convention and a foreign State of citizen is in jured then the 
debate can be transferred to internat ional level becoming a discussion of States 
that must eventually be decided nevertheless only on the basis of the Conven-
tion mentioned. 
A similar objective liability is brought about also by a Convention at 
Brussels, 1962, on. the liability of operators of nuclear ships.124 There is similarly 
an objective liability in connection with the space exploration, as well, as it 
can be established already f rom the first Convention concerning space re-
search.125 The imputabili ty is therefore based on two facts in the exceptional 
cases when on the analogy of a dangerous service in the internal law an 
objective liability is prescribed by international law. The damaged party, fo r 
example in case of a damage originated f rom a nuclear activity, has to prove: 
(1) That the damage is connected with the functioning of a nuclear institution, 
(2) that that institution is functioning on the terr i tory of State X, and then the 
responsibility of State X-has already come about. 
In other cases of .the international responsibility, the causal relation has 
generally no importance because the violation of international law. is brought 
about by t he state act itself , or by the illegal act of a state organ acting in a 
lower instance.. ... ... , 
122 See the text of Convention, in: International Atomic Energy Agency, CN— 
12/46, 2oth May 1963. -
123 Article IV, par. 2: "If the operator proves that the nuclear damage resulted 
wholly or partly either from the gross negligence of the person suffering the damage 
or from an act of omission of such person done with Intent to cause damage, the 
competent court may; if its law so provides, relieve the operator wholly or partly 
from his obligation to pay compensation in respect of the damage suffered by-such 
person. 3) (a) No liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act,of armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war or insurrection, (b) Except in so far as the law of the Installation 
State may provide to the contrary, the operator shall not be liable for nuciear 
damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to a grave natural disaster of an 
exceptional character." . 
124 Article II, par. 1: "The operator of a nuclear ship shall be absolutely liable 
for any nuclear damage upon, proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear 
incident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive products or waste produced in, 
such ship" (Cf. the Convention in: AJIL Vol. 57, 1963, pp. 268—278). 
125 Cf.: Articles VI and VII of the Treaty on principles governing the activities 
of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies. (The American Journal of International Law, 1967, p. 646). 
All this does not mean that the problem of culpability in international law 
is unimportant or even indifferent . In a given case, it may exert an inf luence 
on the severity, juridical estimation of the violation of law in a decisive way. 
There are namely some international delicts the commitment of which could 
not be restricted to a single organ of State. Thus, for instance, a war of aggres-
sion can be launched and made only with the deliberate decision of the S ta te 
and there is no reason to investigate that this act was committed by Ruler , 
Government, Parliament, the Army or some commanding, officers, etc. To be 
sure, the State can only act through i ts organs. But in the example mentioned, 
this act is tha t of the whole of the state organization, it can take place only by 
the decision of the State. Using an analogy f rom the criminal law, it is an 
international delict tha t can only be committed deliberately. Here it is very 
important , almost of decisive significance to investigate the culpability of State. 
Let us take the above-mentioned example: the commander of a warship, while 
of unsound mind, has a foreign merchant ship shelled. The ship is hit and 
sinks. The State under the colours of which the warship sailed is doubtless 
responsible for the action — even if the captain is not responsible for his 
actions owing to his moral irresponsibility — it must indemnity for t he 
damages induced, apoligize, etc. The responsibility of the State in this case 
does not mean obviously any responsibility for the aggression: it i s -s imply 
obliged to pay for the damages caused and to call the perpetrators to account. 
If, however, the war ship executed the action by higher order and her action 
was but the first step of an at tack decided by the State, then tha t State com-
mitted an aggression and will be responsible for that . The legal consequences 
will ten be, of course, quite different f rom those in the first case. The respon-
sibility of State can be extenuated and even declined by a subsequent action 
of the State, by punishing the person who. violated the law, by repairing the 
damage induced, etc. This is the situation particularly if the state organ com-
mitt ing the violation of law is not qualified to represent the State in in ter -
national relations and the violation was committed against a foreign citizen. 
In that case the violating act becomes relevant in international law only indi-
rectly, to wit if the foreign State undertakes the diplomatic protection of its 
own citizen and with this act quasi takes the offence upon itself. The precon-
dition of that is, on the other hand, that the foreigner had previously exhausted 
all t he possibilities of the local legal remedies.126 If, however, in a mult iple-
13(i That is expressed very strongly in the various Drafts. Thus, e. g., a decison 
of the International Law Institute from 1956 is declaring: "Lorsqu'un Etat prétend 
que la lésion subie par un de ses ressortissants dans sa personne ou dans ses biens 
a été commise en violation du droit international, toute réclamation diplomatique 
ou judiciaire lui appartenent de ce chef est irrecevable, s'il existe dans l'ordre ju-
ridique interne de l'Etat contre lequel la prétention est élevée des voies de recours 
accessibles à la personne lésée et qui vraisemblablement sont efficaces et suffisantes 
et tant que l'usage normal de ces voies n'a pas été épuisé. (Résolution sur "la règle 
de l'épuisement des recours internes". Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, 
1956, vol. 46, p. 358). The same principle is expressed in the Draft made by Harvard 
Law School, in 1961 :• Article 1.2. (a): "An alien is entitled to present an international 
claim under this convention only after he has exhausted the local remedies provided 
by the State against which the claim is made." (Draft convention on the international 
responsibility of States for injuries to aliens. Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1969, Vol-. II, p. 143.) Making use of the available local remedies is 
considered to be a precondition of any claim in international law by G. Amador's 
Draft, too. (Cf.: Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1961. Vol. II, p. 50.) 
instance, system of remedies the grievance is not repaired, if e. g., t he ultra: 
vires, i. e. illegal act of the funct ionary proceeding in the first instance is-
followed by a similar act of another authori ty in a higher degree, and in a 
possible procedure in the third instance this is repeated, all this is referring, 
to a so much defecting functioning of the s ta te administration or jurisdiction 
where it is already difficult to deny certain culpability of the State. If, ho-
wever, in t he course of the procedure in the second instance the grievance was-
redressed, the possible damage compensated for, then in the event there is no 
violation of international law. It appears of that, on the other hand, that it is 
not an indifferent circumstance, by authorities of which instance the act of 
violation was committed. As long as the grievance can be remedied according; 
to the internal law of the country, the affa i r remains on the level of the inter-
nal law.127 
In a case where the immediately offended par ty of an international delict 
is another State, then in the major i ty of cases the organ violating the inter-
national obligation is of tha t kind that its acts are to be considered as the 
facts of the State. Thus apart f rom the affa i r of agression already mentioned, 
if a State does not perform a valid t reaty of extradition towards another State,, 
for instance serially refusing the extradition of war-criminals, that cannot take 
place wi thout . the knowledge of the Minister of Justice, of Foreign Affairs,, 
and even of Government. The imputabili ty is therefore not excluded, as a rule, 
by the lack of culpability of the State, but gravity and consequences of the 
violation of international law are decisively influenced by the investigation of 
culpability. 
A third component of the general legal concept of responsibility is the: 
repression of the State. As responsibility — as already mentioned — presup-
poses in international law, too, the possible application of sanctions, applied by 
single States or by a collectivity of them: thus it may be established the con-
cept of the general legal responsibility can be applied on the responsibility in 
international law. Within that, it means a peculiar kind of responsibility that 
is specific and prevailing in the international connections. 
127 It is connectedly established by E. M. Borchard, who distinguishes between 
the acts of state functionaries of higher and lower ranks, that an illegal act com-
mitted by a state functionary of lower rank does not give in itself a basis to the 
responsibility of State. For that a further condition is still necessary, namely that 
the retraction of the illegal act and making responsible the perpetrator are omitted 
to be done by the State. (E. M. Borchard: The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens-
Abroad, or the Law of International Claims. New York, 1927, pp. 189—190.) In my 
opinion, at any rate, is not absolutely important whether or not the state functionary 
has a higher position. In certain cases there may be made non-appealable decisions-
by local authorities, too, that, if violating international obligations, give a basis to the 
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